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The alternative socialist visions presented in the Science & Society special issue
(Science & Society, 1992) span the spectrum of views available today, and provide a useful
starting point for socialist renewal. The contributions that support some sort of planning as an
essential component of socialism (Albert and Hahnel, 1992; Laibman, 1992) do not, however,
go far enough in reasserting the core elements of the socialist philosophy: egalitarianism, com-
munity, and human solidarity.
The main purpose of the anti-capitalist movement has always been to put an end to the
cleavage between haves and have-nots. Egalitarianism is the core of all historical attempts to
set up an alternative to systems based on private ownership. It therefore seems reasonable to
take as a criterion of success for such attempts the degree to which they have managed to sur-
mount social inequalities. As with almost everything else, this is not an all-or-nothing issue; dif-
ferences in both degree and aspect must be taken into account. But the essential design of anti-
capitalism takes egalitarianism as the central regulative ideal, which is to be implemented in
stages, not all of a sudden.
Terms like ‘egalitarianism’ were not to Marx’s liking, and for decades many Marxists
openly combatted what they referred to by that word. However, the Marxian distribution prin-
ciple «To each according to needs,» thought to operate at the higher stage of the post-capitalist
economy, is a very strong egalitarian standard. Marx was sufficiently undogmatic to be able to
consider other proposals, instead of cleaving to the needs principle come what may. On the
other hand, even the distribution principle applicable to the first stage of the new society, «To
each according to work,» is a weakly egalitarian rule, insomuch as it runs counter to inequali-
ties rooted in heritage, previous entitlements, or other privileges. In fact Engels suggested in
Anti-Dühring that even at that stage qualified workers should not be entitled to remuneration
greater than the average, since it is society that has paid for the worker’s schooling and training.
That precept has unfortunately failed to seriously motivate most non-capitalist oriented social
experiments. Most of these have assumed the according-to-work rule to mean that the higher
the worker’s professional learning and preparation, the larger his wages must be, since to that
extent his productivity is greater. But that rationale involves an un-Marxist view of wages as
payment for work. As is well known, Marx rejects this view as correctly describing the labor
market under capitalism, and Marxists generally have claimed that under socialism workers’ in-
come is not equivalent to a capitalist salary — it is not a payment for sale of a commodity, labor
power.
As is the case with many other ideals and fundamental notions, those of equality and
need are neither precise nor clearcut. They can be developed and construed in a variety of ways.
But the mere existence of fuzziness and even some indeterminacy does not mean lack of sub-
stance. Different egalitarian proposals share a mutual core: reducing as much as possible the
disparity between those who profit most and those who benefit least from the goods produced
by human labor, so as to reach an apportionment of goods as equal as possible. ‘Equal’ here
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does not necessarily mean ‘in the same quantity,’ but rather ‘in proportion to some basic cha-
racteristics that are not due to advantage.’ Different schools may disagree as to what those cha-
racteristics are. Yet it appears to be a not unreasonable guess that something like the Marxian
criterion of needs — whatever the difficulties surrounding it — provides the key. This may be
a precarious or ill-defined key, but it is better than no key at all.
Another independent rationale for anti-capitalism historically has been that of avoiding
the waste and squandering associated with market-oriented economies — in other words, to make
economic activity rational. For an individual to act reasonably entails among other things to
control and handle her own activity, to subject it to her aims, i.e. to plan her own life. The
same holds for societies. While market-oriented economies function according to the supply-
and-demand mechanism, through which the outcome does not correspond to an identifiable
social purpose, or for that matter with the purposes of any single individual, the opposite hap-
pens with planned economies.
Although those two grounds for anti-capitalism are in principle separate, it is clear how
well they can be spliced. In fact, from the standpoint of a moral egalitarianism market-origina-
ted waste is most of all to be denounced on account of the appalling inequalities it brings about.
This can be ascertained by considering the market as it really is: a world market, with most of
the planet’s population unable to successfully compete and thus constrained in many cases to
cease production altogether; with the ensuing waste of enormous natural resources and hundreds
of millions of people unemployed, in quite a few cases half-starved. Everybody is acquainted
with these facts, and it is hard to envision any remedy within the framework of a market econ-
omy.
On the other hand, a non-market oriented, planned economy is organized on the prin-
ciple that the social targets have to be settled beforehand, and their attainment pursued through
fulfillment of decisions taken to achieve the stated ends. Economic activity is thus is made to
follow the same pattern as any other rational human activity. The outcome may still fail to
agree with the targets, but the goal is to lessen the disparity as much as possible.
While in a market economy there is no planning of overall results, each enterprise is of
course prone to plan its own activity, in so far as it is allowed to do so on the ground of market
expectations. So we may take a planned economy as a limiting case of a market economy. Per-
haps more useful is the idea that in a planned economy there is only one enterprise, with no
competition, no supply-and-demand mechanism. Economic plans can then be carried out in a
smoother and less unpredictable way than the scattered and contending plans of various and
mutually hostile businessmen.
Planning by itself provides no guarantee that the administration entrusted with drawing
together society’s ends and means acts correctly. Such an administration may happen to be con-
stituted by an inegalitarian elite, trying to magnify its own profit. Nevertheless, it is only
through planning that egalitarianism has any chance of implementation. Although planning is
not a sufficient condition for an egalitarian policy, there are many reasons why inegalitarian
social planners are likely to find themselves in deep water, incurring social blame and re-
sistance. It is difficult if not impossible for an inegalitarian social planner to acknowledge his
inegalitarianism. Inequalities can be justified within a mechanism-regulated society quite well,
as the price to pay for a purportedly general outcome which is all in all preferable. They can
also be justified on the basis of an entitlements theory, like Nozick’s or A. Flew’s. Neither of
these justifications is available to the planners of a new social organization emerging from the
abolition of private ownership of the means of production.
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As with most other human issues, the controversy between market and planning is rife
with dilemmas. There are telling considerations for and against. It may even be the case that
such considerations turn out to be incommensurable, which would entail the awkward conse-
quence of our lacking any rational general choice criterion on the matter. Even so, there may
be particular reasons for different people to favor either alternative. Perhaps every compelling
argument for or against the market, or for or against planning, owes what cogency it has to an-
tecedent value judgments, there being no value-neutral criterion for settling the dispute. My re-
marks should be construed as arguing on the ground of egalitarian assumptions.
There are a number of widely advertised arguments against planning. One is that plan-
ning calls for a degree of knowledge of resources, capacities and work abilities and dispositions
that is unattainable, whereas only through freely reached bargains between contracting parties
can the relevant information be obtained and accordingly acted upon. That argument is a classi-
cal one, with an impressive array of prestigious economists espousing it. Yet if the argument
proves something, it proves too much. Suppose it is sound. Then the same impossibility of gath-
ering information except through market bargains is bound to happen inside a business corpora-
tion: no executive managers can find out about relevant issues unless similar market mecha-
nisms are enacted among the corporation’s branches, departments, bureaus and so on. A vicious
regress ensues, until the individual atoms are reached, which can alone stop it. But of course
experience shows that this is not the case. There is a great deal of useful coordination on the
basis of previous, successful information gathering, with no market mediation. The information
obtained is not indubitable or always reliable — far from it — but neither is information con-
veyed through market mechanisms.
Moreover, modern communications provide effective means of gathering relevant infor-
mation quickly. To be sure, whatever the social organization, some part of the wanted informa-
tion can only be completely secured when it is too late to be acted upon, specially that concer-
ning people’s dispositions. Assessing human capacity and anticipating human conduct is risky.
But the promarket argument we are considering in none the better for that, since what it man-
ages to disclose is a mere truism: that people’s capabilities and leanings can often only be
known after the fact, so that one is bound to make decisions based on conjectures, however
plausible and warranted. The difference in this connection between market and planning lies in
the fact that private owners’ conjecture-based decisions are, each of them, taken on a smaller
scale, which purportedly entails that they cannot be as disastrous as those of social planners.
But that argument is fallacious: the cumulative effect of the invisible-hand supply-and-demand
mechanism can entail consequences much more powerful than the simple addition of the sepa-
rate private owners’ decisions.
A second argument against planning holds that every exchange or transfer is a commer-
cial process, whether both in fact and in name or in fact alone. This is a definitional argument.
It boils down to this convention: whenever something passes from the hands of a person or
group of persons into those of another, there is commerce or trade. Everybody is of course free
to use words as desired, but that usage is deviant. Usually we speak of trade or commerce only
when demand-and-supply mechanisms are involved — that is to say if, and insofar as, the seller
envisages alternative, hypothetically more favorable, outlets for his supply, and the buyer simi-
larly considers a range of alternative sources of supply. The extent to which an exchange is in
fact a commercial one is a matter of degree: the more a consumer, for example, envisages alter-
native sources of supply, the more the exchange transaction is a commercial one, at least so far
as the consumer is concerned. Many a common commercial deal has aspects of mutual care or
preference independent of the pursuit of pure self-interest.
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As was the case with the first argument, the second one, if it proves something, proves
too much: were it successful it would entail, not that market is better than planning, but that
planning is just a different mode of implementation of the market. Thus it provides no reason
for us to prefer a market-oriented economy in the narrow sense.
A third argument couples imperfect information with fragmented self-interest: in planned
economies, it is suggested, local or sectoral unit managers are prone to cheat in order to claim
good plan results, with ensuing waste, disproportions and scarcity. Each individual tries to
maximize his remuneration or reputation by claiming to have reached the best results possible.
In a planned economy, however, the results are comparatively “better” the greater the resources
committed and the smaller the targets. So managers tend to lie: to overrate difficulties in pursuit
of smaller production quotas, and to conceal resources under their control, exceeding necessary
commitments, to be sure to reach the quota come what may.
This is yet another argument which, were it cogent, would prove too much, since the
same thing would happen within a private corporation in capitalist economy, at different local
and sectoral branches, plants, factories, shops, and so on. But it is not cogent. Doubtless there
are trends in human activity which point to such irksome results, but happily there are also con-
trasting trends in human character and behavior. Moreover, even from an egoistic or individua-
listic viewpoint, cheating is not without risks, and this tends to counterbalance the crippling ef-
fect of cheating propensities. Furthermore, even successful market economies, like Japan, owe
a significant part of their accomplishments to motives that are not entirely reducible to self inte-
rest, such as aiming at collective, even national, fulfillment.
On the other hand, advocates of market socialism ought to take into consideration that
the more supply-and-demand mechanisms are grafted into an overall planned economy, and the
greater the accounting autonomy of decision-makers in different branches, local and regional
departments or production and distribution units, the more likely they are to behave as private
owners, and so to cheat if they find it useful for their purposes.
A fourth argument addresses the gap between planning in reality and its ideal conception
in the minds of theoreticians. In fact the task of implementing planning is so difficult that it is
in practice unavoidably ill-organized, with different boards overlapping in unpredicted and con-
flicting ways, irrational resource allocations, bureaucracy, routine, stagnation or, alternatively,
preposterous, erratic, whimsical and ineffectual innovations. We may concede that people are
likely to miscalculate and to act unreasonably. Fortunately, however, this is not always the case.
People in a market economy are just as prone to similar misjudgment and misbehavior, which
compounds the other drawbacks that are unique to market mechanisms. Real, existent planning
can never be as beautiful and well-oiled as designers had hoped, but neither is the real, existent
market as good as market economists have promised. Is the discrepancy between theory and
practice larger in the case of planning? I do not think so. The almost infinite unhappiness and
misery market economy has inflicted upon a huge proportion of the world population seems to
buttress the conjecture that the cleavage is larger within capitalism.
A fifth argument is that in a planned system economic agents lack incentives and tend
to behave sluggishly; while with the market people are afraid of failure and unemployment, and
so are constrained to act briskly and enterprisingly. This argument is perhaps the only one
which has some validity. Even so, we are bound to ponder its weight. Supposing the argument
is right, are such considerations paramount? No. If the cost of such incentives is too high, it is
preferable to do without them. Too much or too widespread failure and unemployment are an
unacceptable price to pay for the existence of economic briskness. Furthermore, experience con-
clusively shows that routine, listlessness and so on are quite common under capitalist market
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conditions, even with huge failure rates and unemployment. There are several reasons for this.
One is that many people’s positions are secure, even under such conditions, or at least are mis-
takenly taken to be so by those concerned. Moreover, economic incentives are not the only mo-
tivating force goverfning people’s behavior. Employees in capitalist firms often lack any interest
in their employer’s financial or commercial success, and have reasons even to resent such suc-
cess; they are prone to think they benefit in a degree far smaller than they deserve, with resul-
ting apathy. Even entrepreneurs themselves are sometimes dispirited and downcast, owing to
high probabilities of failure, lack of good commercial prospects, or any other reason. If the ar-
gument tries to show that businessmen “as” businessmen are brisk, enterprising economic
agents while bureaucrats and unemployment-protected workers are lazy and shiftless, it commits
a gross unwarranted simplification, and, what is more, avails itself of an obscure gimmick: fal-
ling back on “as” statements. With “as” reduplications you can uphold anything and every-
thing, at a low cost — in fact no cost at all, since nobody knows what inferences can be drawn
from such enigmatic clauses.
A sixth argument sees planning as rigid, while market mechanisms are flexible and
bestow upon decision makers wide latitude, room to maneuver. But both rigidity (resoluteness)
and improvisation are good, and this — as with most other issues — is a matter of give and take.
Each of these opposite patterns has some advantage, and some cost. Were unconditional and
unconstrained improvization and flexibility always to be preferred at whatever cost, life would
be unbearable for everybody. Other things being equal, the more our lives are planned, the
better for us all. Needless to say, a wise and mindful planner will be aware that many things
turn out to be different from what we had expected them to be, and so some room for maneuver
should be allowed to decision makers.
A seventh argument claims that price determination in a planned system confronts mutu-
ally contradictory tendencies and considerations, while in a market economy there is an overall
determining factor — the law of supply and demand — and perhaps in last resort, at least ac-
cording to the classical economists, the commodity’s value. I reply that it is much more reason-
able to act upon a balance of mutually contradictory considerations, since they are real and
relevant. On the other hand, to the extent that prices in a market economy are determined solely
by supply and demand mechanisms, they are settled in a blind, irrational way, which ignores
most important issues and motivations. The simplicity of price-determination in the market
(whether real or merely ideal) betokens the irrationality of trying to live and act as if reality
were simple and consistent; as if our overall interests were not multifarious and many-sided and
more often than not full of contradictions. What we see nowadays — the awful distress and suf-
fering of hundreds and even thousands of millions within the world market economy — has
something to do with the irrationality of such simple mechanisms, even if in capitalist market
practice things are far less simple and contradictory considerations are also often taken into
account.
The eighth and last argument I will discuss is but a variation of the fifth one: planning
fails to provide the specific kinds of incentives that in market-oriented economies are conducive
to technological innovations and improvements. This argument amounts to the claim that people
are prone to become enthusiastic, energetic, inventive, and resourceful in order to get rich,
whereas, failing such a prospect, little can shake them from making do with what they already
have and know. Perhaps there is some truth in this pessimistic view of human nature. I feel a
strong inclination, however, to think we are not as blind and selfishly greedy as that. Yes, some
people are covetous, but not all. Not even all capitalists are only motivated by self-centered
avarice, or at least not always, not even whenever they are acting “as” capitalists, whatever that
may mean. Many people in history have been extremely resourceful for reasons quite different
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from any longing to get rich. Even when people’s main purpose is to secure wealth, most fre-
quently that is not just for themselves, but for their families, sometimes for their clans, some-
times for their towns or cities; in fact, sometimes for their countrymen as well. A communita-
rian sense of solidarity, of a collective all-embracing “We,” is doubtless called for if a non-
market society is going to fully develop and prosper. Failure to emphasize such ethical issues
may have been one of the avoidable shortcomings of former non-capitalist regimes. In this con-
nection let me quote Leibniz, who, trying to devise some argument for private ownership, finds
this one:
Since the state cannot care for all of men’s domestic affairs, it must preserve the ownership of goods
so that each will have his own sphere which he can enhance and put into good order; otherwise, if
everything were commonly owned, it would be neglected by individuals, [unless] it were arranged [as
it is] among the members of religious orders, which would be difficult these times. Thus the state must
maintain the possessions of individuals. (Leibniz, 1972, 64.)
I think Leibniz was wrong because I am confident states may come to care for every-
body’s needs and be organized just as communities sharing their goods and caring for each
other, with a strong, pervading concern for the human species as what it really is, a great if now
unfortunately quarrel-ridden family. Steps towards such a pananthropistic outlook seem likely
to go hand in hand with advances towards fully implemented economic planning.
Let me now offer a couple of arguments in support of full-fledged planning (which —
I find it to be hardly worth reminding the reader — does not mean that such planning can be at-
tained all of a sudden, or that its defence entails an all-or-nothing approach). First argument.
Agreeing with anti-market thinkers that private-ownership is all-in-all not conducive to social
welfare, and even unjust, some authors advocate some variety or other of market socialism (this
position is represented in the S&S discussion by Schweickart, 1992). The core of this view is
to combine market supply-and-demand mechanisms of free contract among self-interested but
reasonable economic agents with the abolition of private ownership of the means of production.
But I claim that to the extent that there are commodity relations there is private property. For
one thing, if, and in so far as, a group of workers collectively manages an enterprise and enters
into bargaining relations with others, they are behaving as private owners. Their ownership is
no less private than a private cooperative’s in the capitalist market, or than an individual’s for
that matter. Suppose that within market socialism a cooperative group gets rich and wealthy,
while another one is ruined. Can the impoverished people join the rich workers group? There
have been bitter and disappointing experiences of self-management in some former socialist
countries, and there are still others in China and elsewhere.
My second argument concerns “free” pricing. The modern market is world wide, and,
if prices are left to the law of supply and demand, the majority of the planet’s population will
continue to live in poverty. Doubtless market socialists propose some correctives to avoid the
catastrophic consequences of unfettered supply and demand. Now, in economic practice, as in
everything else, there are degrees; it is not a question of an exchange mechanism being either
entirely market-based or else completely planned. Since non-capitalist social organization has
only recently been established, the market character of many exchanges seems quite likely and
unavoidable. What is problematic in the views of market socialists is that they regard this state
of affairs as intrinsically preferable to full-scale planning.
My contention is quite simple and clear: the more supply-and-demand mechanisms are
allowed to stand and even grow within an overall planned economy, the greater is the
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possibility of capitalist evils reappearing under socialist cover, as the sad experience of real
socialism has in fact suggested. Yet, some dose of those mechanisms, and thus also of the evils
accompanying them, is inevitable for quite some time after the nominal abolition of a capitalist
private-ownership system. To the extent that managers in a planned economy act like market-
managers, to the extent their criterion is the law of supply and demand, to that extent private
ownership is still present. It can be expunged only little by little, with the contest remaining
undecided for quite long time. All through that process, salary disparities are also unavoidable,
since in fact to some degree labor is still a commodity, and so subject to the law of supply and
demand. But only to some extent. If, and when, social administrators are aware of those trends
and of the overall purpose of socialist transformation, they ought gradually to reduce such dis-
parities and to try to reach, as much and as fast as possible, an egalitarian distribution — as e.g.
on the basis of Marx’s needs criterion.
Orthodox Marxists may think that such a view overemphasizes distribution as against
production relations, but, whatever the thought of the Marxist founders may be, the relation be-
tween production and distribution is a complex one, with no clear-cut boundary and no general
one-sided causal precedence. There are more things on the economic earth, or even in economic
heaven (which is less heavenly than we expected it to be) than our theories are keen on fea-
turing.
♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠
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